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Analysis of climate and other environmental questions on regional surveys conducted over 
2017–2020 (9,000+ live telephone interviews) elaborate on the well-known importance of 
political factors by adding support for three newer but replicated propositions. (1) Strength of 
political identification predicts climate-change views within the ranks of conservatives to a much 
greater degree than within ranks of liberals, evidence that conservatives’ climate-change views 
are more politically determined. (2) Factor analysis suggests that climate-change beliefs meet 
statistical criteria for being an indicator of sociopolitical identity, alongside the traditional 
indicators of ideology and party, or the newer one of Trump support. This result underlines the 
need for caution when interpreting models that include climate beliefs in addition to other 
identity indicators such as party or ideology among their independent variables. (3) Having 
mostly same-party friends intensifies the already-strong effects of political identity on views 
regarding climate change, local weather, conservation, renewable energy, and wildlife 
management. Twelve examples show multiplicative (interaction) effects of political identity and 
same-party friends across different dependent variables, political indicators and datasets. These 
identity×friends results build upon other recent studies, confirming that sociopolitical feedbacks 
accentuate political divisions on the environment, and particularly so among conservatives. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
A formulaic introduction for social-science papers on anthropogenic climate change starts by 
noting the disconnect between an overwhelming consensus among climate scientists, on the one 
hand, and deep divisions in US public opinion, on the other. Those public divisions primarily 
reflect conservative rejection of the scientific consensus, leading to strong correlations between 
political-identity indicators (such as party or ideology) and climate beliefs, which have been 
replicated in every study that looked. Other respondent characteristics such as age, gender and 
physical location affect climate views too, but political identity tends to dominate (Shwom et al. 
2015). 
 
In US data, political identity often moderates the effects of education. Agreement with the 
scientific consensus on climate change tends to rise with education or science literacy among 
liberals and moderates, whereas it shows no relationship or even declines with education/literacy 
among conservatives (Drummond and Fischhoff 2017; Hamilton 2008, 2011; Hamilton et al. 
2012, 2015a; Kahan et al. 2012; McCright and Dunlap 2011; Shao et al. 2014). A similar 
interaction between objectively-tested knowledge and political identity has been observed in 
Australian data as well (Tranter 2019). Studies elsewhere have rarely tested for such interactions, 
but their results often do agree with the main-effects pattern that acceptance of anthropogenic 
climate change rises with education, and declines with conservative identity (Devine-Wright et 
al. 2015; Gregersen et al. 2020; McCright et al. 2015, 2016; Tranter 2017). Self-assessed 
understanding, sometimes used as a proxy for knowledge, exhibits political 
identity×understanding interactions with a similar flavor (Hamilton 2011; McCright and Dunlap 
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2011). Interpretation of self-assessments is tricky, however, because they mix respondents’ 
actual knowledge with their political certainty — especially among conservatives (Hamilton 
2015a, 2018). 
 
The frequent occurrence of political identity×education-type interaction effects in US (and now 
Australian) data undermines conclusions about education from studies that do not explicitly test 
for such interactions. Common explanations for the interactions invoke information-filtering 
processes, positing that better-educated individuals are more efficacious in acquiring information 
that reinforces prejudices and fits with their social identity. Theoretical concepts associated with 
information filtering include biased assimilation (Corner et al. 2012; Ehret et al. 2017; McCright 
and Dunlap 2011), compensatory control (Kay et al. 2009), cultural cognition (Kahan et al. 
2011), elite cues (Brulle et al. 2012; Carmichael and Brulle 2017; Darmofal 2005), motivated 
reasoning (Druckman and McGrath 2019; Kraft et al. 2015; Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge 
2006), reinforcing spirals (Feldman et al. 2014; Slater 2007) and solution aversion (Campbell 
and Kay 2014). 
 
Although they share common insights that people selectively acquire information that supports 
their prejudices, these concepts differ in their details. Elite cues, for example, refers to a top-
down process by which political leaders, activists or media inform followers about identity-
consistent positions. Rejection of anthropogenic climate change, initially spread by fossil fuel 
interests and conservative think tanks to political leaders and media, and from there to the base, 
provides one striking example (Jacques et al. 2008; Dunlap and McCright 2015). Even more 
striking has been the politicization of US response to the COVID-19 pandemic, spreading rapidly 
from President Trump to supporting politicians, media and voters (Adolph et al. 2020). In both 
cases, however, we see bottom-up processes like biased assimilation at work too, as people 
attend to and accept/reject information sources, arguments and leaders based on fit with their 
own sociopolitical identity. The top-down and bottom-up dynamics form a reinforcing spiral. 
 
Implicitly symmetrical language of “polarization” or “partisanship” has characterized much 
social-science writing, but left/right asymmetry appears in numerous studies (Jost 2017; van der 
Linden et al. 2020). Conservatives tend to have more politically homogeneous networks on 
online platforms such as Twitter (Boutyline and Willer 2017), are more politically selective in 
choosing their sources of information (Rodriguez et al. 2017), pay closer attention to cues about 
identity-appropriate views (Bullock 2011; Carmichael et al. 2017), show greater interest in 
ideologically compatible fake news (Guess et al. 2018), and are more inclined to conspiratorial 
thinking (van der Linden et al. 2020). One reflection of conservatives’ conspiratorial thinking is 
their lower trust in scientists, both generally and across a range of specific topics (Gauchat 2012; 
Hamilton 2015b; Lewandowsky et al. 2020; Nadelson et al. 2014) including vaccines and 
pandemics (Hamilton et al. 2015b; Hamilton and Safford 2020). Most recently, conservative 
science rejection has been a striking feature of US public reactions to the crisis of COVID-19 
(Brzezinski et al. 2020; Cassese et al. 2020; Lewandowsky and Cook 2020; Safford and 
Hamilton 2020; multiple polls linked in Saletan 2020).  
 
A more mundane realm of demonstrated asymmetry involves perceptions of local weather. 
Subjective recollections of weather — extreme events, recent experience, or longer trends — 
often correlate with climate-change beliefs. Such correlations might reflect weather influencing 
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beliefs, but are equally consistent with beliefs shaping perceptions of weather (Myers et al. 2013; 
Shao 2015). A number of studies where the relevant weather events are known objectively find 
that conservatives and individuals who reject the reality of anthropogenic climate change more 
often report past weather that seems consistent with their position, whether accurately or not 
(Borick and Rabe 2017; Hamilton and Lemcke-Stampone 2016; Hamilton et al. 2016a,b, 2018; 
Howe and Leiserowitz 2013). 
 
In this paper we examine details of the relationship between political identity, views on climate 
change, and other environmental opinions. The depth of political divisions on climate and 
environmental topics is well established, but our analysis brings up less obvious points consistent 
with several recent studies. These points involve asymmetry in how the strength of partisan 
identity affects environmental opinions; statistically evaluating climate beliefs as being 
themselves a valid indicator (alongside ideology and party) for sociopolitical identity; and testing 
for multiplicative effects from having friends mostly of your same party. Our analysis considers 
data from three US regional survey projects. Although regional surveys do not provide a 
nationwide picture, for environmental research they have the advantage of raising issues with 
tangible, place-relevant importance such as local weather, wind power development or wildlife 
management. Generality of regional-survey results can be explored through replication across 
different regions and issues, as we begin to do here. 
 
 
2.  Data and Methods 
 
This analysis brings together data from three recent projects that carried out regional surveys in 
northern New England, the Intermountain West and New Hampshire. These three projects 
focused on different and often locally-salient topics, but their surveys shared similar methods, 
and some common questions on climate change and the environment. For each survey, trained 
interviewers at the University of New Hampshire (UNH) Survey Center called randomly-
selected cell and landline telephone numbers, then applied a rule (adult with most recent 
birthday) to randomly choose interviewees within households. Following data collection, 
probability weights were calculated to adjust for design bias (number of adults and telephone 
numbers in each household; population of each county). Weighting based on Census population 
profiles allowed further adjustments to achieve results close to representative for the study 
regions regarding age, sex and education. Such weights have been applied consistently to all 
graphs and analysis in this paper, as with other publications using these datasets. 
 
Northeast Oregon and the North Country both are rural regions that have experienced declines in 
their historically resource-based economies, offset to variable degrees by service-sector and 
amenity-based development. Politically, northeast Oregon could be described as conservative. 
Trump won 65 to 71 percent of the votes from these counties in 2016, and acceptance of human-
caused climate change falls below national levels (ranging from 38 to 48 percent in northeast 
Oregon surveys conducted over 2011–2018; see Hamilton et al. 2016a, 2019 and Hartter et al. 
2020). North Country politics are more moderate. Trump votes ranged from 38 to 52 percent in 
these counties in 2016, and anthropogenic climate change achieves close to national recognition 
(65 percent on the 2017 North Country survey, compared with 64 percent on a nationwide survey 
that asked the same question the previous year; see Hamilton et al. 2019). Compared with 
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northeast Oregon or the North Country, the state of New Hampshire is larger, with greater urban 
populations and economic diversity. About 47 percent of state voters chose Trump in 2016, 
compared with 46 percent nationwide. Although New Hampshire’s population includes 
proportionately fewer minorities and more college graduates than the US as a whole, statewide 
surveys on science/environment topics often yield results that are close to those of nationwide 
surveys (e.g., Hamilton 2016). For example, a nationwide survey in late summer/fall 2016 found 
64 percent agreement that climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities. 
Contemporaneous statewide New Hampshire surveys likewise found 64 percent agreement 
(Hamilton et al. 2019). Our three regional survey projects, and their common climate-change 
question, are described in more detail below. 
 
There is a two-county geographical overlap between the North Country and New Hampshire 
surveys. These two counties contribute less than 9 percent of the New Hampshire data, however, 
and there should be little overlap in respondents from the independently-drawn samples. 
 
2.1.  Three survey projects 
 
North Country: In summer 2017, survey by researchers at the Carsey School of Public Policy 
(University of New Hampshire, UNH) interviewed 1,650 residents of four rural counties of 
northern New England: Oxford County, Maine; Essex County, Vermont; Coös and Grafton 
Counties, New Hampshire. Interviewing was done by trained personnel at the UNH Survey 
Center (response rate 19%, calculated by AAPOR 2016 definition 3). Interviewers asked 
residents’ views on conditions and challenges in their communities, with some questions 
replicating earlier surveys from 2007 and 2010. Hamilton and coauthors (2017) draw basic 
comparisons across the counties and survey years. Focusing on two climate-related questions, 
Hamilton et al. (2018) observed a new interaction effect: having mostly same-party friends 
intensified partisan divisions not only on the reality of anthropogenic climate change, but on an 
earlier question that simply asked whether recent winters in that region have, on average, been 
warmer (factually true). Similar interactions affecting two other environmental opinion items not 
investigated for the 2018 paper are documented below. 
 
Northeast Oregon: The interdisciplinary Communities and Forests in Oregon (CAFOR) project 
carried out four surveys in this region from 2011 to 2018. The most recent of these surveys, 
analyzed here, involved 1,097 interviews done in September 2018 (response rate 25%) with 
residents of Baker, Union and Wallowa Counties. Earlier northeast Oregon CAFOR surveys 
have been described in papers focusing on land use, resources, wildfire and climate topics (e.g., 
Boag et al. 2015, Hamilton et al. 2016a, Hartter et al. 2018). Interaction effects recently noted by 
Hamilton et al. (2020) and Hartter et al. (2020) are reviewed here, along with a new analysis 
showing similar effects on renewable-energy views. 
 
New Hampshire: The Granite State Poll (GSP) interviews statewide random samples of about 
500 New Hampshire residents four times each year. The GSP is best known for its political 
polling, and routinely asks a wider range of political questions than did the North Country or 
northeast Oregon surveys. Consequently, our political analysis can be more detailed with these 
New Hampshire data. In addition, the Granite State Poll often carries environmental or science 
questions for basic research, which through years of repetition have shown high stability and 
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criterion validity (e.g., Hamilton et al. 2015a). Median GSP response rate was 17% over the 
period analyzed in this paper (February 2017 to February 2020). With a standard climate-change 
question as dependent variable, having mostly same-party friends proves to strengthen the effects 
of four different indicators for political identity. 
 
Sampling and telephone interviews for all three surveys followed consistent protocols, 
implemented by the UNH Survey Center. Sampling weights, employed with all graphs and 
analyses in this paper, permit adjustments for known design and response bias to achieve more 
representative results. All three surveys carried similar demographic items along with regionally-
appropriate environmental questions. 
 
2.2.  Variable definitions and coding 
 
Table 1 lists questions providing dependent variables for this paper: items about climate change, 
local weather, renewable energy, and regional environment. Codes used for subsequent logit 
regression modeling are listed as well. The general climate changing item, common across all 
three surveys, has been asked on dozens of different regional and nationwide surveys (e.g., 
Hamilton et al. 2015a, 2019). Our analysis of this variable will focus on one particular response: 
“climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities.” This was the most 
popular choice on all surveys, and has straightforward interpretation as agreement with the 
scientific consensus (corresponding, for example, to the first sentence in AGU 2019). The 
climate changing/human caused response has shown replicable results across tens of thousands 
of interviews. In contrast, other responses to the climate changing question are less stable and 
harder to interpret because the “not changing” and “caused by natural forces” options both 
appeal, at different times, to people whose bedrock position is rejection of human-caused climate 
change. Historically, during a 1998–2013 period when average global temperatures changed 
relatively little (described by some as a global-warming “hiatus” or “pause”), conservative 
commentators claimed that global warming had stopped, or never existed. Then as global 
temperatures climbed rapidly in subsequent years, that rise was blamed on El Niño, nominally a 
natural cause (Nuccitelli 2017). In effect, conservative discourse pivoted from “not changing” to 
“changing but naturally caused,” which might seem mutually incompatible but more basically 
deny the reality of human-caused change. 
 
  <<Table 1 about here>> 
 
Following similar logic to focus on the most interpretable and salient response in each case, other 
dependent variables in Table 1 have also been dichotomized for logit analysis. This 
simplification offers statistical as well as substantive advantages. Multi-category models (e.g., 
ordered logit or multinomial logit) yield conclusions that broadly agree with dichotomous 
results, but tend to be less interpretable, replicable or robust as they estimate more parameters 
from thinner categories, such as the 4 percent of North Country respondents who said that 
climate change is not happening now. A multinomial logit model for climate changing requires 





Table 2 lists indicators for sociopolitical identity, also shown with codes used for modeling. The 
indicators include standard items for ideology, party, and approval of President Trump. Party is 
represented by 7-category (party7) or 4-category (party4) indicators — the latter distinguishing 
the distinctively conservative category of Tea Party supporters, as proposed by Hamilton and 
Saito (2015; also see Leiserowitz et al. 2011; Shao 2017). Path analysis by Bolin and Hamilton 
(2018) examined connections in earlier surveys between Watch Fox News and party, ideology 
and beliefs about climate change. Friends is the newest question in our present analysis, making 
explicit the “socio” part of sociopolitical by asking whether most of the respondent’s friends 
prefer the same party they do. This question was first tested on the 2017 North Country survey, 
where significant party4×friends interactions were found to affect responses to both recent 
winters warmer and climate changing (Hamilton et al. 2018). Testing for replicability of such 
interactions, the friends question was later asked on northeast Oregon and New Hampshire 
surveys. 
 
  <<Table 2 about here>> 
 
As coding in Table 3 indicates, most of the political-identity indicators are treated as ordinal 
predictors in the regression models that follow, as they were in the earlier studies cited. Such 
treatment is supported by monotonic and approximately linear effects observed in many datasets 
(examples relevant here are graphed in Hamilton et al. 2016b, 2018, 2020). Alternative treatment 
of political indicators as collections of unordered categories tends to yield broadly similar results 
but with fussier interpretation and less replicability. More importantly, an unordered-category 
approach for political indicators discards what we know about ordinality of the phenomena itself. 
 
3.  Climate Views and Political Identity 
 
Strong correlations between political identity and public views on climate change have been 
documented across countless US datasets (e.g., Hamilton et al. 2015a; McCright and Dunlap 
2011; Marquart-Pyatt et al. 2014), and a growing number from other countries (e.g., Gregersen et 
al. 2020; McCright et al. 2015; Tranter 2017). Political identity is most often represented by 
questions about ideology or political party, concepts that seem theoretically distinct — but in 
recent US data appear practically interchangeable, in terms of their correlations with other 
variables. Using ideology, party and two other indicators for political identity available in our 
New Hampshire dataset, Figure 1 shows the strong gradients on agreement that climate change 
is happening now, caused mainly by human activities. The number of observations varies from 
panel to panel in Figure 1 and elsewhere in this paper, as we employ the maximum available 
dataset (rather than listwise deletion) for best precision in each analysis. Results are noisier but 
yield substantially similar conclusions if we instead limit analysis to a smaller subset of 





Figure 1:  Agreement that climate change is happening now, and caused mainly by human activities, 
correlates strongly with four indicators for sociopolitical identity (definitions in Tables 1–2). Data from 
2017–2020 statewide New Hampshire surveys; for background and other references on these surveys 
see Bolin and Hamilton 2018; Hamilton et al. 2019. 
 
At least 89 percent of those who identify as liberals (Figure 1a) agree with the scientific 
consensus that humans are changing the climate; there is at most a weak gradient of a few points 
across four steps from extremely liberal (96 percent) through fairly, somewhat or moderately 
liberal (91 percent). Among conservatives, on the other hand, we see a steep gradient of 31 
points from moderately conservative (50 percent) to extremely conservative (19 percent). The 
political party question in Figure 1b offers just seven response categories, but exhibits a similar 
pattern: strong Democrats, not very strong Democrats (abbreviated to “Weak Dem” for the 
graphic) and independents closer to Democrats (“Ind Dem”) all express around 90 percent 
agreement with the scientific consensus, whereas among Republicans, acceptance of climate 
change falls as strength of partisanship rises. There is some indication that self-identified 
independents closer to Republican (“Ind Rep”) actually are more partisan than the much smaller 
group of not very strong Republicans (“Weak Rep”). 
 
The finding in Figures 1a and 1b that climate-change views correlate with strength of ideological 
or partisan identity among conservatives/Republicans, but not so among liberals/Democrats, 
replicates a conclusion from nationwide data by Morin-Chassé and Lachapelle (2019). This 
pattern implies that rejection of climate change is driven by political identity among 
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conservatives, but less so among liberals, who might attend more to scientific reports, current 
events or personal observations in forming their views. Whether partisan patterns reflect the top-
down effects of elite cues (Darmofal 2005; Brulle et al. 2012), or the bottom-up effects of biased 
assimilation (Corner et al. 2012; McCright and Dunlap 2011), such processes appear stronger 
among conservatives (Hamilton 2018). Related evidence of asymmetry comes from a unique 
panel study by Jenkins-Smith et al. (2020), who observe that Republican/conservative 
individuals’ beliefs about climate change exhibit greater time-to-time variation, in no particular 
direction, while Democrat/liberal individuals’ beliefs remain more stable. Their study attributes 
this difference to Democrats/liberals receiving consistent messages from political leaders and 
scientists, giving them less reason to change views; whereas for Republicans/conservatives the 
political and scientific messages are diametrically opposed. A “mixed messages” conflict might 
result in shifting views, particularly (looking again at Figures 1a and 1b) among less extreme 
partisans. 
 
Figures 1c and 1d chart climate views against two other political indicators that yield similarly 
steep gradients. Acceptance of anthropogenic climate change falls from 92 percent among people 
who strongly disapprove of President Trump to 26 percent among those who strongly approve. 
Several recent studies report that Trump approval or voting predicts climate-change views as 
well if not better than traditional ideology or party questions (Hamilton 2017, 2019; Shao and 
Hao 2019). Trump approval, to a greater extent than other political indicators, exhibits a starkly 
bimodal distribution: in these data more than 70% either strongly disapprove (45%) or strongly 
approve (26%) of President Trump. Fewer than 4% say they “lean toward” approving or 
disapproving. Despite the hollowed-out middle ground, Trump approval in Figure 1c exhibits a 
milder version of the patterns seen in 1a and 1b: views on anthropogenic climate change 
correlate with strength of partisan identification to a greater degree among conservatives (31-
point gradient from lean approval to strongly approve) than they do among liberals (18-point 
gradient from lean disapproval to strongly disapprove). 
 
The Fox News question also does not find much middle ground; 51% say they never watch. 
Among those who do watch, we see a climate-change gradient consistent with previous studies 
(Bolin and Hamilton 2018; Feldman et al. 2012; Krosnick and MacInnis 2010). Figure 1d shows 
recognition of anthropogenic climate change falling from 81 percent among those who say they 
never watch Fox News to just 23 percent among those who watch it every day. Other analyses 
(not shown, but parallel to comparisons by party in Hamilton 2018) find that daily watchers of 
Fox News tend to be less accurate on climate-related but belief-neutral knowledge questions, 
from the meaning of “greenhouse effect” to the location of the North Pole. 
 
Entered together in a principal components factor analysis, ideology, party, Trump approval and 
Fox News viewing all load on one underlying dimension. By this rough statistical criterion, the 
four indicators could arguably be viewed as proxies for a single latent variable: political identity. 
Moreover, if climate changing responses are entered along with the other four indicators, all five 
variables load on a single dimension, which explains 68 percent of the cumulative variance 
(Table 3). This first principal component is the only one with an eigenvalue above 1.0, 
indicating that further components account for less than a single indicator’s variance; they are 
worse than useless in terms of simplifying the data. The first component’s theta reliability, a 
special case of Cronbach’s alpha that is appropriate for principal components, is θ = 0.88. These 
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basic results in Table 3 agree with a psychometric analysis by Dan Kahan, who showed that 
ideology, party, and two items for global-warming beliefs could “all be viewed as measuring the 
same thing: a latent (unobserved) disposition that causes different groups of people to adopt 
coherent sets of opposing stances on political matters” (Kahan 2015:10). Section 4 looks more 
closely at the “groups of people” aspect tying climate beliefs to sociopolitical identity.  
 
  <<Table 3 about here>> 
 
Causality among the five indicators in Table 3 is difficult to untangle. We do not argue that in 
general these indicators all should be combined into one latent variable, although that could work 
for some purposes. But whether climate-change views are theoretically understood as an 
indicator for identity, or just strongly caused by identity, their shared variance raises statistical 
and interpretive problems for many published analyses. Research that includes climate-change 
beliefs alongside other political indicators among the independent variables is forcing estimation 
of separate effects from correlated and causally interconnected measures, potentially yielding 
unstable results while understating the real effects of political identity. 
 
 
4.  Multiplicative Effects of Same-Party Friends 
 
Nationwide surveys find that Americans increasingly choose to associate socially with people 
who share their political orientation; and that people who do so tend to have more negative 
feelings about other groups (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Pew Research Center 2014, 2016, 
2017). Causality presumably operates in both directions, with stronger partisans choosing like-
minded friends, and like-minded friends strengthening partisanship, in a positive feedback that 
exacerbates polarization. 
 
4.1.  North Country interactions 
 
The proposition that people with mostly like-minded friends are more polarized can be 
formalized as an interaction hypothesis, testable by including the multiplicative effect of 
party×friends or similar terms among the predictors of politically-linked opinions. The friends 
question defined in Table 2 was developed for this purpose, and first fielded on the 2017 North 
Country survey. Adjusted margins plots in Figure 2 visualize party4×friends interaction effects 
on four environment-related dependent variables from that survey (definitions in Tables 1 and 2). 
Panels 2a and 2b repeat findings described by Hamilton et al. (2018): having mostly same-party 
friends steepens the impact of political identity on (2a) perception that recent North Country 
winters have been warmer, which they have; and (2b) more general belief that humans are 
changing the climate (asked after the winters question, which itself does not mention climate 
change). All effects graphed in Figure 2 are calculated from weighted logit regression models 
which include the same covariates described in Hamilton (2018): respondent age, sex, education, 
party4×education interaction, and years lived in the region. Each panel gives the estimation 
sample (n) for that analysis, and also the two-tailed t test probability (p) for that interaction 
effect’s coefficient. Thus, the recent winters warmer analysis in panel 2a involved 1,443 





Figure 2:  Agreement that recent winters in the North Country have been warmer, human-caused climate 
change is happening, wind energy development is important, and conservation rules have been a good 
thing here — by political party and most friends are same party (definitions in Tables 1–2). Data from 
2017 North Country survey; adjusted margins plots calculated from logit regression models consistent 
with Hamilton et al. 2018. 
 
Panels 2c and 2d in Figure 2 depict similar interactions from the same dataset that were not 
discussed in the earlier paper. Having mostly same-party friends makes the most conservative 
respondents (Tea Party supporters) significantly less likely to agree that wind-powered electricity 
is important for their community’s future (2c), or that conservation rules restricting development 
have generally been a good thing (2d). For consistency, panels 2c and 2d also are calculated from 
weighted logit models having the same covariates as 2a and 2b. Details within each panel vary, 
but all show the same general pattern: having mostly same-party friends significantly steepens 
the partisan gradients affecting environment-related views. 
 
4.2.  Northeast Oregon interactions 
 
Figure 3 graphs party4×friends interaction effects on four environmental dependent variables in 
the 2018 northeast Oregon survey. The dependent variable for panel 3a is whether respondent 
thinks that recent summers in that region have been warmer, on average, than summers 30 or 40 
years ago. In reality the summers have warmed, affecting the frequency of large wildfires 
(Hamilton et al. 2016a; Hartter et al. 2020). Panel 3b involves our standard climate-change 
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question. Friends interactions significantly steepen the partisan gradients in 3a and 3b, similar to 
their effects on the analogous winter-warming and climate-change questions in the North 
Country survey of Figure 2. For consistency with Hartter et al. (2020), logit regression models 
for panels 3a and 3b include age, sex, education and years resident as covariates, along with 
party4×education interactions. P-values shown are for party4×friends interactions. 
 
 
Figure 3:  Agreement that recent summers in northeast Oregon have been warmer, human-caused 
climate change is happening, renewable energy development is higher priority, and wolves should be 
eliminated from this region — by political party and most friends are same party (definitions in Tables 1–
2). Data from 2018 northeast Oregon survey; margins plots calculated from logit regression models. For 
panels a, b and c the covariates are age, sex, education, years resident, and party4×education 
interaction. For panel d covariates are age, sex, education, newcomer/oldtimer status, county of 
residence, and party4×education interaction. 
 
Panel 3c shows a new analysis with the same predictors and covariates but a different dependent 
variable: whether respondent thinks that renewable energy development (rather than increased 
exploration for oil) should be a high priority for the US. Having mostly same-party friends again 
steepens the partisan gradient, but its impact happens mainly among Tea Party supporters, the 
most conservative group. That pattern occurs more weakly with several other items as well, but 
is equally pronounced, in a different dataset, with the thematically related wind-power question 




Same-party friends, especially among Tea Partiers, also steepen partisan effects on the opinion 
that wolves should be eliminated from eastern Oregon (panel 3d). Hamilton et al. (2020) discuss 
the wolves issue in detail. For consistency, the logit model in 3d employs the same covariates 
used for the wolves analysis in that earlier paper. As with all other panels in Figures 2 and 3, the 
party4×friends interaction in 3d is significant (p < 0.0005). 
 
Analyzing these same 2018 Oregon data, Hartter et al. (2020) note an important topic where 
party×friends interaction effects are not evident: there is bipartisan agreement on the increasing 
frequency of large wildfires in the region. This exception to the interaction patterns seen with 
other topics in Figure 3 makes sense in terms of local reality, given the very high salience of 
rising wildfire risks. More generally, it highlights that such interactions should be viewed as 
testable hypotheses, with illuminating results either way. 
 
4.3.  New Hampshire interactions 
 
Figure 4 plots a previously unpublished set of interactions predicting climate-change beliefs 
(climate changing, defined in Table 1), based on all 2018–2020 New Hampshire surveys that 
asked the friends question. These New Hampshire surveys carried a wider range of political 
questions than did the North Country or Oregon surveys, as illustrated previously with the four 
charts in Figure 1. In Figure 4 we demonstrate political identity×friends-type interactions in 
simple 2-predictor models involving each of the four political indicators: ideology, party (here a 
7-category version), Trump approval and Fox News viewing. Estimation samples, limited by the 
friends question, are smaller than those charted in Figure 1 but still 1,200 or more in each panel. 
These results, calculated from the weighted logit regression models in Table 4, show interaction 
effects on climate-change views (definitions in Tables 1 and 2). In each case, having same-party 
friends steepens the effects of political identity, in the same way seen with other variables and 
datasets in Figures 2 and 3. Three of the four interactions (ideology9×friends, party7×friends 
and Trump×friends) are statistically significant, while the fourth (Fox×friends) falls just short of 
significance (p = 0.063). In all four panels, multiplicative effects from same-party friends appear 





Figure 4:  Agreement that human-caused climate change is happening — by four different indicators of 
political identity, and most friends are same party (definitions in Tables 1–2). Data from 2018–2020 New 
Hampshire surveys; margins plots calculated from logit regression models in Table 4. 
 
  <<Table 4 about here>> 
 
Of the 12 interactions plotted in Figures 2, 3 and 4, seven depict new results, while five show 
results from earlier papers. The earlier analyses inspired a search for further examples, soon 
found within both the original datasets (North Country and northeast Oregon) and in new data 
from New Hampshire. Figures 2c, 2d, 3c, and all panels in Figure 4 are the new results here, but 
the big picture comes from bringing all 12 graphs together. 
 
 
5.  Discussion 
 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show political identity×friends interactions with similar meanings across 
different regional datasets, political-identity indicators, and environment-related dependent 
variables. The replications make a case for exploring such effects more widely in research. 
Under what conditions do interactions of this nature arise? Are they becoming more prevalent? 
Are they most common in rural settings, such as our North Country and northeast Oregon 
surveys? At this point, the pattern has not been demonstrated as broadly as political 
identity×education-type interactions. Nor do identity×friends interactions exhibit the dramatic 
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sign-reversal effects of identity×education. But the identity×friends interactions add new 
elements to our understanding, in part by making the “socio” part of sociopolitical explicit. 
 
The steepening effects of same-party friends might not appear visually dramatic when contrasted 
with main effects that already are steep, as in many of these graphs. Quantitatively, however, 
they can make a big difference. In Figure 3d, for example, the partisan gap on favoring 
elimination of wolves is almost three times wider (about 55 points) among people with mostly 
same-party friends, compared with those having mixed or different-party friends (20 points). 
Figure 2c shows another threefold multiplication: the gap regarding importance of local wind 
power is more than 30 points given same-party friends, compared with just over 10 points 
otherwise. These issues have practical importance, and widening gaps could put policy 
compromise out of reach. 
 
A 2014 report from Pew Research Center observed that 
“‘Ideological silos’ are now common on both the left and right. People with 
down-the-line ideological positions — especially conservatives — are more likely 
than others to say that most of their close friends share their political views.”  
The political identity×friends graphs shown above depict what looks like siloing at both ends of 
the spectrum — liberals and conservatives with mostly same-party friends are farther apart than 
their mixed-party peers, across many issues. This likely reflects positive feedback: partisans 
choose like-minded friends, and like-minded friends (or the perception that most friends are like-
minded) make one more partisan. Although social scientists and journalists often describe 
polarization with implicitly symmetrical terms, something happening on both sides, the Pew 
statement notes a critical asymmetry: it happens most among conservatives. Similar asymmetry 
appears in our findings as well. In many instances (most strikingly, the wind power/renewable 
energy questions on two different surveys), we see that same-party friends make a bigger 
difference on the conservative side of our graphs. Moreover, confirming Morin-Chassé and 
Lachapelle (2019), we find that acceptance of anthropogenic climate change is unrelated related 
to strength of ideological or partisan identification among liberals/Democrats, whereas it is 
strongly related among conservatives/Republicans. 
 
The climate-change case highlights substantive asymmetry. When liberals recognize the reality 
of anthropogenic climate change, their views align with their political elites, it is true — but also 
with the overwhelming majority of scientists, whose expertise liberals are generally more 
inclined to trust (Carmichael et al. 2017; Hamilton 2015b). Increasingly, these views also align 
with physical-world experience and news reports of current events, from altered seasons to more 
extreme weather (as documented in USGCRP 2017). Conservatives rejecting the reality of 
anthropogenic climate change likewise align with their political elites, but they do so in 
contradiction to most scientists or sometimes even local weather, as Hamilton and Lemcke-
Stampone (2016) and many other studies observe. The concept of ideological silos (or more 
accurately, sociopolitical silos) should not become a presumptive explanation for group 
differences, because such differences do not necessarily reflect narrowly-sourced information. 
Within-group homogeneity of views might indeed reflect politically-guided information filtering, 
as the “silo” term implies. But alternatively, such homogeneity could for other groups reflect 
information drawn from diverse sources that reinforce each other because they describe the same 
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The social bases of environmental concern — especially age, gender, education and political 
identity — have been fairly stable, making these among the best-replicated findings of 
contemporary social science. Beyond confirming the broad patterns identified by Van Liere and 
Dunlap (1980), newer US studies have observed the now-overwhelming dominance of political 
factors compared with other individual and situational predictors. More subtly, many studies 
report political identity×education-type interactions such that education shows positive effects on 
environmental concern among liberals and moderates, but no effects or even negative effects 
among the most conservative. The present study builds cumulatively on past findings by adding 
support for three newer propositions: (1) strength of political identification predicts climate-
change views among conservatives more than it does among liberals, suggesting that 
conservatives’ views are more politically determined; (2) climate-change views are so well 
correlated with ideology, party, Trump approval and watching Fox News that for practical if not 
theoretical purposes, all five might be conceived as measuring the same underlying dimension; 
and (3) especially among conservatives, having mostly same-party friends intensifies the 
already-strong effects of political identity on environmental views including climate, 
conservation, renewable energy and wildlife management. Each proposition elaborates on the 
well-established linkage between conservative identity and lower concern about the environment 
which, especially in connection with climate change, extends to rejecting the relevant science. 
Studies currently in progress observe conservative science rejection spilling over, with disastrous 
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Table 1:  Definitions of dependent variables from North Country, NE Oregon and New 
Hampshire surveys. Shown with coding used for analyses of Figures 2–4 and Tables 3–4. 
 
 
Climate changing (all surveys) — “Which of the following three statements do you think is more accurate?” 
 Climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities (1) 
 Climate change is happening now, but caused mainly by natural forces (0) 
 Climate change is not happening now (0) 
 Don’t know/no answer (0) 
 
Recent winters warmer (North Country) — “Which of the following statements do you think is more accurate? 
Northern New England winter temperatures over the past 20 years have been ...” 
 Warmer, on average, than winters 30 or 40 years ago (1) 
 About the same, on average, as winters 30 or 40 years ago (0) 
 Cooler, on average, than winters 30 or 40 years ago (0) 
 Don’t know/no answer (0) 
 
Wind power important (North Country) — “How important you think wind-powered electricity generation is for 
your community’s future?” 
 Very important (1) 
 Somewhat important (1) 
 Not important (0) 
 Don’t know/no answer (0) 
 
Conservation rules good (North Country) — “Have conservation or environmental rules that restrict development 
generally been a good thing for your community (1), a bad thing (0), or have they had no effect (0)?” 
 
Recent summers warmer (NE Oregon) — “Which of the following statements about past climate in this region do 
you believe is most accurate? Northeast Oregon summer temperatures over the past 20 years ...” 
 Have been warmer, on average, than summers 30 or 40 years ago (1) 
 Have been cooler, on average, than summers 30 or 40 years ago (0) 
 Have been about the same, on average, as summers 30 or 40 years ago (0) 
 Don’t know/no answer (0) 
 
Renewable energy priority (NE Oregon) — “For the future of this country, which do you think should be a higher 
priority? 
 Increased use of wind, solar and renewable energy sources (1) 
 Increased exploration and drilling for oil (0) 
 Don’t know/no answer (0) 
 
Eliminate wolves (NE Oregon) — “Which of the following four statements about wolves in eastern Oregon comes 
closest to your personal beliefs?” 
 Wolves should be eliminated from eastern Oregon (1) 
 Limited hunting of wolves should be allowed (0) 
 Wolves should not be hunted, but landowners compensated for losses (0) 
 Wolves should not be hunted, and no landowner compensation is needed (0) 






Table 2:  Definitions of sociopolitical indicators from North Country, NE Oregon and New 




Ideology — “In politics, do you generally think of yourself as a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative?” 
 Extremely liberal (–4) 
 Fairly liberal (–3) 
 Somewhat liberal (–2) 
 Moderate, leans liberal (–1) 
 Moderate, leans neither (0) 
 Moderate, leans conservative (+1) 
 Somewhat conservative (+2) 
 Fairly conservative (+3) 
 Extremely conservative (+4)  
 
Party7 — “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or 
what?” 
 Strong Democrat (–3) 
 Not very strong Democrat (–2) 
 Independent, closer to Democrat (–1) 
 Independent, closer to neither (0) 
 Independent, closer to Republican (+1) 
 Not very strong Republican (+2) 
 Strong Republican (+3) 
 
Party4 — Defined from combination of two questions: Party7 and “Overall would you say you support the political 
movement known as the Tea Party, you oppose the Tea Party, or that you neither support nor oppose it?” 
 Democrat (–1 if strong D, not strong D, or Independent closer to D) 
 Independent (0 if Independent, closer to neither) 
 Republican (+1 if strong R, not strong R, or Independent closer to R) 
 Tea Party (+2 if support Tea Party) 
 
Trump approval — “Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president?” 
 Strongly disapprove (–3) 
 Disapprove somewhat (–2) 
 Lean toward disapproving (–1) 
 Neither, not sure, don’t know (0) 
 Lean toward approving (+1) 
 Somewhat approve (+2) 
 Strongly approve (+3) 
 
Watch Fox News — “How often, if ever, do you watch Fox News?” 
 Never/don’t know (0) 
 Occasionally (1) 
 Several times a week (2) 
 Every day (3) 
 
Friends — “Would you say that most of your friends prefer the same political party that you do (1)? Or do most 






Table 3:  Principal components factor analysis of four political-identity indicators and climate-
change views. New Hampshire survey data from 2017–2020; n = 2,093. Variable definitions and 




    Proportion 
Factor  Eigenvalue of Variance Cumulative  
 1 3.397  0.679  0.679 
2 0.558  0.112  0.791 
3 0.514  0.103  0.894 
4 0.279  0.056  0.949 
5 0.252  0.051  1.000 
 
One factor with eigenvalue >1 retained, explaining 67.9% of total variance. Theta reliability θ = 0.88. 
 
Indicator  Factor 1 Unique 
Variable  Loading Variance  
Ideology  0.856  0.267 
Party7   0.852  0.275 
Trump approval 0.890  0.207 
Watch Fox News 0.753  0.433 







Table 4:  Weighted logit regressions of agreement that human-caused climate change is 
happening on political identity indicators, most friends same party, and political identity×friends 
interactions. Dataset pools all New Hampshire surveys which asked the friends question (2018–
2020). Table shows logit coefficients, standard errors, t tests, probabilities, and estimation 




   Coef  SE  t  Prob  n  
 
Ideology  –0.707  0.068  –10.29  0.000  1,623 
Friends  –0.533  0.187  –0.29  0.775 




Party7   –0.856  0.083  –10.28  0.000  1,626 
Friends  –0.074  0.175  –0.42  0.672 




Trump   –0.707  0.058  –12.10  0.000  1,741 
Friends  –0.135  0.185  –0.73  0.466 




Fox    –1.148 0.149  –7.72  0.000  1,218 
Friends  –0.315  0.240  –1.31  0.189  
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